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ABSTRACT
Consciousness is now a well-established field of empirical research. A large body of experimental
results has been accumulated and is steadily growing. In parallel, many Theories of Consciousness
(ToCs) have been proposed. These theories are diverse in nature, ranging from computational to
neurophysiological and quantum theoretical approaches. This contrasts with other fields of natural
science, which host a smaller number of competing theories. We suggest that one reason for this
abundance of extremely different theories may be the lack of stringent criteria specifying how
empirical data constrains ToCs. First, we argue that consciousness is a well-defined topic from an
empirical point of view and motivate a purely empirical stance on the quest for consciousness.
Second, we present a checklist of criteria that, we propose, empirical ToCs need to cope with. Third,
we review 13 of the most influential ToCs and subject them to the criteria. Our analysis helps to
situate these different ToCs in the theoretical landscapeand sheds light on their strengths and
weaknesses from a strictly empirical point of view.
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I The problem of consciousness
Descartes (1637/1996) is usually considered as the founder
of the mind-body problem, the precursor of the modern
topic of consciousness. He proposed a dualistic framework,
in which mind and matter are two separate ontological
entities, interacting at the pineal gland. Such dualistic the-
ories are not easy to reconcile with the fundamental laws
of physics, namely, the conservation of energy and
impulse. For this reason, most modern philosophical and
scientific theories of consciousness are compatible with
physicalism, in which only matter exists and mental events
are identical to or supervene on physical processes (Stoljar,
2017). Many philosophical approaches, however, deny that
consciousness can be reduced to physics (e.g. Chalmers,
1996). At the center of the debate is the notion of qualia,
the subjective phenomenal qualities of experience: how it
is to feel pain, experience a shade of green, or a wonderful
piece of music. Levine (1983) introduced the term expla-
natory gap to highlight the difficulty of physicalist theories
in explaining phenomenal properties; Chalmers (1996)
called it the hard problem.
This philosophical debate has been ongoing for dec-
ades, hovering around the question of whether we can
close the explanatory gap or whether it is impossible for
principled reasons. At the highest level, there are two
different attitudes. Realists propose that consciousness
really exists as a distinct property, and the job of science
is to understand how it is generated (e.g. Chalmers,
2004). In contrast, illusionists suggest that we are simply
wrong about the nature of consciousness (e.g. Dennett,
2016; Frankish, 2016ba): consciousness, as a non-physi-
cal property, is an illusion and the relevant question is:
why do people feel that they have such a non-physical
property ‘inside’ them? Another important theoretical
dispute concerns the distinction between access vs.
phenomenal consciousness (see Block, 1995; Cohen &
Dennett, 2011; Naccache, 2018; Phillips, 2018; Ward,
2018). One of the major problems in these discussions
is that consciousness seems to evade a rigid definition,
making it difficult to pit theories against each other like
in other scientific disciplines.
Here, we leave these hard philosophical problems aside
and focus on empirical approaches to consciousness only,
as suggested in the seminal work of Crick and Koch (1990).
We wake up every day and change from an unconscious to
a conscious state. Obviously, there is something to explain.
We can render visible stimuli invisible by backward mask-
ing. Obviously, there is something to explain here too.
Because of these clear empirical phenomena, there is no
need to posit a theoretical definition. Empirical science
starts with good observations and aims for definitions.
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Consciousness science is ripe for such a purely empirical
approach. Indeed, a large body of detailed empirical data
has been accumulated. Nevertheless, as mentioned, there
are dozens of very different ToCs and there is no clear,
largely accepted ‘winner’. However, not all these ToCs can
be correct. We suggest that this conceptual quagmire may
result from a lack of stringent criteria guiding how to
address consciousness empirically. Here, we will propose
a list of such criteria. We will use this checklist to compare
current ToCs, aiming to foster constructive discussions
about how to address and explain consciousness. The list
is neither proposed to be exhaustive nor are the criteria
written in stone. Rather, we see this list as a steppingstone
to compare ToCs in a structured manner by working out
criteria that describe how predictions of a ToC can be
falsified empirically and how to pit theories against each
other. Currently, there are very few mutual comparisons
between ToCs. Instead, authors build on their own ToCs,
largely ignoring others (but see Ball, 2019).
Importantly, ToCs often make explicit or implicit
metaphysical assumptions, such as subscribing to illu-
sionist or realist ideas or relying on access or phenom-
enal consciousness. As mentioned, the focus of this
contribution is only on how ToCs address empirical
data about consciousness, such as masking, rivalry, or
the difference between sleep and wakefulness. All scien-
tific theories need empirical support regardless of their
metaphysical assumptions, and therefore need to
address the criteria. Because the criteria are geared
toward explaining empirical data, they are strongly
linked to behaviour. However, this does not mean that
ToCs need to be behaviourist or functionalist. Our cri-
teria are neutral regarding metaphysical assumptions
and also apply to theories focussing on phenomenal
consciousness, which require data if they want to be
considered as empirical theories.
Another important note is that this contribution is not
aimed to compare specific ToCs with each other but to
pit common ideas and principles of ToCs against each
other. This is not a catalog of the latest version of each
ToC, but a critical evaluation of basic arguments in con-
sciousness research.
The following points spell out what the aims of this
contribution are, and what is not addressed:
(1) Consciousness can be approached from a purely
empirical stance.
(2) There is a bewildering number of ToCs, suggest-
ing that stringent criteria are missing.
(3) This contribution is a steppingstone to build such
criteria and provide a compass to locate ToCs in
a space of these criteria.
(4) Not all current ToCs can be correct. Hence, the
ultimate goal is to reduce the number of ToCs,
subsuming current ideas into mutually exclusive
theories making clear cut, novel, and empirically
testable predictions that, if confirmed, will
exclude one theory or another (which is rare in
consciousness research).
(5) This contribution is not a review of specific ToCs. It
is about general arguments in the field.
(6) We think the field is ripe for a coherent research
program, which goes beyond proposing conscious-
ness is identical with another phenomenon X.
(7) This contribution is not about metaphysics, such
as realism vs. illusionism. However, ToCs need to
meet criteria regardless of metaphysical assump-
tions if they claim support from empirical data.
II Empirical phenomena of consciousness
In all sciences, it is important to have a good description
of the phenomenon of interest, which subsequently
needs to be explained by theories. In the following we
list several classic distinctions about consciousness.
II.1. Does the theory address the content or the
state of consciousness or both?
From an empirical perspective, there are two main
aspects of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996; Searle, 2000).
First, there are unconscious states, such as non-REM
sleep and anaesthesia. These are contrasted with con-
scious states, such as being awake (there are also more
ambiguous states, such as hypnosis or meditation).
The second main avenue in consciousness research
concerns the content of consciousness. For example, in
visual masking, a target element is followed by a mask,
which renders the target not consciously perceived
(Figure 1a). The not-conscious target can still influence
visual information processing, i.e., its representation is
active and influential in the human brain (see Peters &
Lau, 2015, for difficulties in studying unconscious percep-
tion). For example, words can be semantically processed
without being consciously perceived (Gaillard et al., 2006)
and expert chess players can analyse chess situations
without consciousness (Kiesel et al., 2009). Likewise, in
binocular rivalry, different images are presented to the
two eyes. When the images are not compatible, only one
of the images is perceived and the other one is sup-
pressed (Figure 1b). When the images are of ‘equal’
strength, they rival, i.e., the suppressed image becomes
conscious after a few seconds and the previously visible
image is rendered unconscious. During the unconscious
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periods, the suppressed image can still influence informa-
tion processing. For example, even if an image is fully
suppressed for the entire duration of the experiment,
humans can unconsciously learn about its features (Seitz
et al., 2009). Other paradigms used to study the content of
consciousness include continuous flash suppression (a
version of binocular rivalry; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005),
change blindness (Simons & Levin, 1997) and crowding
(Atas et al., 2014; Bouma, 1973; see Breitmeyer, 2015;
S. Dehaene et al., 2017; Kim & Blake, 2005, for reviews of
empirical methods for consciousness).
ToCs may address the content or the state of con-
sciousness, or ideally both. In practice, ToCs are not
always clear about which of these aspects they address.
II.2. Is consciousness graded or binary?
We have the intuitive feeling that state consciousness is
a gradual phenomenon. There is a continuum from
death, to coma, anaesthesia, drowsiness, and fully alert
states. Even within these states there seems to be con-
tinuity. For example, depth of anaesthesia can be classi-
fied by the bi-spectral (BIS) index. However, it is unclear
to what extent this intuition is correct. Another open
question is whether the content of consciousness is
gradual.
II.3. Is consciousness unitary?
Although we feel that we have only a single conscious-
ness at one moment in time, Moutoussis and Zeki (1997)
argued that the brain may hold many simultaneous
consciousnesses because motion and colour are per-
ceived (consciously) at different moments in time,
reflected by different neural activities in different brain
regions. Most other approaches to consciousness pro-
pose that consciousness is unitary.
II.4. Is consciousness temporally continuous or
discrete?
Unconscious targets can be re-rendered conscious when
a second mask follows the first (Breitmeyer & Öğmen,
2006). Therefore, there must be an extended period of
unconscious processing since otherwise there could be
no recovery from masking (had the first mask
Figure 1. a) Masking. A briefly presented prime (left pointing arrow) can be rendered invisible by a trailing mask (arrow with central
gap). Even though observers do not consciously perceive the prime, it can still affect unconscious brain processing. For example,
observers are asked whether the masking arrow points either to the left or right. When the prime and mask arrows point in the same
direction (congruent trials), reactions are faster than when the arrows point in opposite directions (incongruent trials). Figure
reproduced with permission from Vorberg et al. (2003) Copyright (2003) National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A. b-c) Binocular rivalry.
b) Two different images are shown to the left and right eye at the same time. When the images are not compatible, only a single
image is perceived at a time. After a few seconds, there is a switch and the other image is perceived. Hence, the content of
consciousness alternates between the two images. In this example, a cat was presented to one eye and a house to the other. Figure
reproduced from Doerig, Schurger, et al. (2019). c) An example of a six-neuron network explaining binocular rivalry. Figure reproduced
with permission from Wilson (2003) Copyright (2003) National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A.
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irretrievably suppressed the target representation,
the second mask could not render it conscious again).
A similar finding is that a masked stimulus can be re-
rendered conscious by a transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion (TMS) pulse (Ro et al., 2003). This unconscious inte-
gration period can last for 420 ms as experiments using
TMS and feature fusion have shown (Scharnowski et al.,
2009; Rüter et al., 2010; see also Pilz et al., 2013). Drissi-
Daoudi et al. (2019) have also shown mandatory uncon-
scious integration up to 450 ms. Relatedly, Sergent et al.
(2013) showed that a cue presented after a target stimu-
lus that would otherwise remain unconscious can retro-
spectively render the stimulus conscious. These results
raise the question of whether consciousness is
a continuous stream of percepts or is discrete, i.e., con-
sciousness occurs at only certain time points (Doerig,
Scharnowski, et al., 2019; Fekete et al., 2018; Herzog
et al., 2016; James, 2013; VanRullen & Koch, 2003;
White, 2018).
II.5. What is the fate of unconscious elements?
As mentioned, even when elements are not consciously
perceived, e.g., because they are masked, they can still
be fully processed as objects and influence conscious
processes. Even more surprisingly, features of uncon-
scious elements can be visible at other consciously per-
ceived elements, presented at different times and
locations (Nishida et al., 2007; Otto et al., 2006). For
example, Otto et al. (2006) used masking to render
a target unconscious. They showed that features of this
unconscious masked target can be perceived con-
sciously as features of unmasked elements presented
later and at different spatial locations. What differenti-
ates processing of unconscious features and elements
from conscious ones? If processing of unconscious fea-
tures is fundamentally different from conscious ones
how can they interact with each other?
III Hard criteria for empirical theories of
consciousness
While the empirical literature blossomed, a comparable
bonanza of ToCs emerged. These theories vary greatly in
terms of what they aim to explain and how they explain
it – ranging from quantum theories aimed at explaining
human understanding, to computational theories aimed
at explaining masking and attentional blink experi-
ments. Here, we present a list of criteria that we propose
all empirical ToCs need to cope with regardless of their
underlying metaphysical positions.
Importantly, we see this list as a starting point and
other criteria may be proposed too. However, we
propose that this list is constraining enough to provoke
interesting discussions about how to study conscious-
ness empirically.
There are obvious criteria that any ToC needs to meet.
For example, the scope of the theory must be clear: is the
theory about the content of consciousness, the state of
consciousness, or both? Moreover, as for any scientific
theory, the proposed mechanism must be both neces-
sary and sufficient to explain data about consciousness.
In the following, we outline four further important cri-
teria specific to consciousness research.
III.1. Paradigm cases of consciousness & the
unconscious alternative
Paradigm cases of consciousness (Aaronson, 2014) are
empirical phenomena focussed specifically on con-
sciousness, and not on other co-occurring aspects.
They must have conscious and unconscious alternatives,
allowing us to pit conscious vs. unconscious processing
against each other – otherwise one cannot be certain
that consciousness per se and not other co-occurring
processes are addressed (this is reminiscent of Baars
(1986) contrastive approach). In masking, for instance,
the target is perceived consciously under certain condi-
tions and it remains unconscious under other conditions.
Going from long to short inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs)
between target and mask leads to a change from full
target visibility to zero visibility. For certain ISIs the
target is consciously perceived in 50% of trials. As men-
tioned, in trials where the target is not consciously per-
ceived, it can still influence processing (Figure 1a). This is
the unconscious alternative: the target is processed but
not consciously perceived (Figure 2a&b). To explain
a paradigm case, ToCs need to show how changes in
their mechanism explain changes from consciousness to
unconsciousness (Figure 2c).
Importantly, it follows that introspection by itself
does not allow one to study paradigm cases of con-
sciousness. Indeed, introspection only addresses the
conscious alternative since, by definition, we are una-
ware of the unconscious alternative. For example, when
we are unaware of the masked target in a masking
experiment, introspection does not provide any informa-
tion about unconscious processing. Hence, although
introspection may seem to offer a privileged window
on consciousness, well-controlled experiments are also
needed to address paradigm cases.
Even though problems with this contrastive approach
have been highlighted recently (Aru et al., 2012; Balsdon
& Clifford, 2018; Kleiner & Hoel, 2020; Lau, 2008; Peters &
Lau, 2015), all that is needed is the existence of con-
scious and unconscious states, and methods to contrast
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them (but see Salti et al., 2019, for an argument that the
conscious vs. unconscious dichotomy is misguided). For
visual masking and other paradigms, specific procedures
have been established to differentiate between con-
scious and unconscious perception (Morales et al.,
2015; Overgaard et al., 2010; Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006).
Paradigm cases with an unconscious alternative
ensure that consciousness is the dependent variable in
experiments, and contrast with approaches where only
conscious states are investigated. We already mentioned
introspection. Other approaches study only conscious
(and not unconscious) states and their changes, such
as how consciousness changes under the influence of
LSD, other psychotropic substances or meditation
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2014; Lutz et al., 2007), or track
changes in body ownership and map them to brain
states (Faivre et al., 2015). Other approaches target spe-
cific processes thought to be constitutive for conscious-
ness, such as neural binding (Edelman, 2003), learning
(Cleeremans, 2007), or insight (Hameroff & Penrose,
2014). Because these approaches lack an unconscious
alternative, they need to cope with the problem that
they may be addressing other co-occurring processes
instead of consciousness per se (see section IV.1).
It is not enough to explain just a few paradigm cases.
A theory of consciousness must be more general than
a theory of binocular rivalry, otherwise it is merely
a theory of rivalry. For example, the 6-neuron model of
rivalry in Figure 1c is not a model of consciousness.
A rich phenomenology of consciousness is needed to
Figure 2. Paradigm cases of consciousness. a) In paradigm cases of consciousness, first, the phenomenology of consciousness is clear
cut and, second, there are both a conscious and an unconscious alternative (for example wakefulness vs. death, perceived vs. non-
perceived image in rivalry, visible vs. invisible prime in masking, etc). In all these cases, there is obviously something to explain about
consciousness. b) In a masking experiment, we can fix one intermediate ISI for which the prime is consciously perceived on certain
trials and not on others. The mechanism of a ToC needs to explain what causes this difference. A second avenue is to change the ISI
parametrically. For short ISIs, the prime is invisible (the direct measure is zero). For longer ISIs, the prime is clearly visible. The
mechanism needs to explain in a parametric manner how consciousness emerges as a function of key components of the mechanism.
One caveat with this method is that the mechanism should reflect a change in consciousness and not only in stimulus strength. There
are methods to double dissociate the two (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). c) Theories must explain paradigm cases by proposing
a mechanism explaining in which cases the conscious/unconscious alternatives occur. To this end, changes in the mechanism must
reflect the observed changes of the paradigm case. A mechanism is not necessary if consciousness occurs when the mechanism
predicts unconsciousness and it is not sufficient if the mechanism predicts consciousness but there is no consciousness. A mechanism
that is neither necessary nor sufficient has no explanatory power and must be rejected because there is a double dissociation between
the mechanism and consciousness. d) An ideal ToC proposes a necessary and sufficient mechanism for each paradigm case. This can
be achieved by showing that changes in the mechanism account for changes from the conscious to the unconscious alternatives for all
paradigm cases of consciousness. Explaining all paradigm cases is important, because a theory that can only explain binocular rivalry
for example is just a theory of rivalry, not a ToC.
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move beyond such models. The underlying commonal-
ities between all paradigm cases need to be understood
(Chalmers, 1996; Fingelkurts et al., 2012; Haynes, 2009;
Seth, 2016). Hence, ideally, a ToC should explain para-
digm cases by a principled mechanism (Figure 2d). It
may also be that different aspects of consciousness
need different mechanisms (for example, content and
state consciousness may involve different mechanisms).
In summary, our first criterion asks whether a ToC
addresses paradigm cases of consciousness. If it does
not, the ToC needs to provide a principled argument
showing that it nevertheless targets consciousness
per se. In addition, it is important for a ToC to provide
principled reasons why it targets consciousness in gen-
eral, beyond the specific paradigm cases it addresses.1
III.2. The unfolding argument
An important aspect is the level on which ToCs describe
consciousness. For example, many ToCs situate con-
sciousness at the level of functions performed by
a system, while causal structure theories focus on the
implementation level. Causal structure theories are ToCs
that associate consciousness with the presence of the
‘right’ kind of causal structure in a system. Consciousness
occurs when neurons are connected in just the ‘right
way’. Information Integration Theory (Tononi, 2004) and
Recurrent Processing Theory (Lamme, 2006) are exam-
ples of causal structure theories. Both theories imply that
recurrent processing is necessary and sufficient for
consciousness.
It is a mathematical fact that both recurrent and
feedforward networks (along with many other kinds of
universal function approximators) can approximate any
input-output function to any degree of accuracy (Hornik
et al., 1989; Schäfer & Zimmermann, 2006). The inputs
may be the stimuli of a rivalry experiment and the out-
puts are the participant’s responses such as button
presses. Like all functions, this sensorimotor processing
can be implemented equivalently in feedforward and
recurrent networks. One can always unfold a recurrent
network into a functionally equivalent feedforward net-
work and vice versa.
Hence, feedforward and recurrent systems can per-
form in exactly the same way in a rivalry experiment, for
example. The same is true for any possible experiment
about consciousness. According to causal structure the-
ories, the recurrent system is conscious whereas the
feedforward system is not. As a consequence, the
unfolding argument challenges causal structure theories
because, if one accepts that two functionally identical
systems can have different consciousness, these ToCs
cannot be addressed empirically, and are therefore out-
side the realm of science (see Doerig, Schurger, et al.
(2019) for a detailed presentation of the Unfolding
Argument; Hanson and Walker (2019) and Kleiner and
Hoel (2020) for related arguments, and Kleiner (2019)
and Tsuchiya et al. (2020) for replies).
As an example, Recurrent Processing Theory proposes
that visual consciousness arises in primary visual cortex
when recurrent processing kicks in (Lamme, 2006).
However, these regions can in principle be replaced by
feedforward equivalents without changing anything
about their input-output function. Since there is no
functional difference, a patient with such an implant
behaves identically and does not report any difference.
Hence, since the mechanism suggested by Recurrent
Processing Theory can be replaced without any change
in data about consciousness, this mechanism cannot be
necessary to explain data about consciousness.
Hence, our second criterion asks whether a ToC is
subject to the unfolding argument. If so, the ToC needs
to explain how experiments can support or falsify it.
III.3. The small & large network arguments
III.3.a. Conscious small networks
Herzog et al. (2007) showed that many ToCs imply that
small networks with fewer than ten neurons are con-
scious. There are two alternative stances to deal with the
small network argument.
III.3.b. Fixing theories with additional constraints
First, a ToC may reject that the small networks are in fact
conscious. In this case, the theory is not sufficient for
consciousness because it cannot explain why the small
networks are not conscious. Something is missing from
the theory. To avoid this problem, it is often proposed
that only small, non-crucial addendums need to be
added.
Size. For example, it was claimed that full conscious-
ness occurs only in networks with many neurons (Taylor,
2007). However, a large network with millions of neurons
‘behaves’ identically to a single neuron if all neurons do
the same thing. Thus, size by itself does not suffice.
Complexity. An alternative proposal may be that com-
plexity is crucial. However, for many definitions of com-
plexity, even very small networks with less than 10
neurons exhibit high complexity (Herzog et al., 2007;
Oizumi et al., 2014).
Crucial additional ingredients. Even if it were possible
to ‘fix’ these ToCs by adding just the ‘right’ ingredients, it
1These latter two requirements echo the exclusiveness and exhaustiveness requirements of Reingold and Merikle (1988).
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may be that these additional ingredients are more
important to explain consciousness than the proposed
mechanism itself. In general, when a mechanism is pro-
posed to be only necessary, it needs to be clarified how
much of the variance the mechanism explains. How
crucial is it for consciousness?
III.3.c. Panpsychism
Alternatively, a ToC may propose that small networks are
conscious. In this case, the ToC implies a form of panpsy-
chism: all or most systems in the universe are conscious
to varying degrees. A criterion needs to be given to
specify exactly which systems are conscious. This criter-
ion is not constrained by empirical data because there
are no paradigm cases for small networks. Therefore, it
must always be chosen arbitrarily. Hence, unless
a principled argument is given to show why this ToC
with these criteria is correct, panpsychist ToCs are not
sufficient to explain consciousness. See Seth (2018) and
Frankish (2016b) for other methodological problems
with panpsychism, and Goff (2017) for a defence of
panpsychism.
III.3.d. The large network argument
Accepting consciousness in small networks also poses
a challenge for large systems. The human brain contains
more than ten billion neurons. If networks with less than
ten neurons can be conscious, the human brain may
contain billions of conscious subsystems. One needs to
provide an additional non-arbitrary criterion explaining
which subsystem is conscious, or to deny the unity of
consciousness. Unless a principled argument is given to
showwhy this ToC with these criteria is correct, the ToC is
not sufficient to explain consciousness. This problem is
known in philosophy as the combination problem
(Chalmers, 2017).
In summary, our third criterion asks whether ToCs are
subject to the small (and large) network argument and, if
they are, how they deal with it. Do they embrace panp-
sychism and, if so, how do they cope with the under-
determination issues this raises? It is important for a ToC
to be explicit about these points.
III.4. The other systems argument
A ToC should be able to determine which systems, apart
from awake humans, are conscious. Hence, ToCs focuss-
ing on the normal human brain must either be
generalizable to other systems, or provide a strong argu-
ment showing why only humans can be conscious.
For example, it was proposed that consciousness is
mediated by thalamo-cortical interactions (Llinas et al.,
1998). Thus, a question is whether animals without
a thalamus can have consciousness? How about the
human in Figure 3? One simple reply would be that
removing an adult’s thalamo-cortical system makes the
person unconscious, so it must be that the human in
Figure 3 has an equivalent of the thalamo-cortical sys-
tem. However, then the question is which properties
shared by the thalamo-cortical system and its equivalent
are important for consciousness?
This question is particularly difficult given the strong
multiple realizability of many phenomena.2 It is well
known that any function can be implemented by different
physical systems (Bechtel & Mundale, 1999; Fodor, 1974).
A word processing system such as Microsoft Word can be
run on many operating systems such as Unix, MacOS or
Windows. Phenomenologically, there is no difference.
However, there are large differences in the software and
hardware implementations. Hence, simply pointing to the
software and hardware used in the Windows implementa-
tion can neither explain what Microsoft Word is nor indi-
cate in which other systems it can be instantiated. More
precisely, although the software and hardware used in that
implementation are sufficient to instantiate Microsoft
Figure 3. A sagittal scan of a person with strongly reduced brain
volume. The patient lives a normal life, has no cognitive pro-
blems, and is as conscious as any other human. It is not easy to
map explanations of consciousness based on brain anatomy and
connectivity to the brain of this patient. Reproduced with per-
mission from (Feuillet et al., 2007).
2Multiple realization has been a fruitful topic in philosophy (Fodor, 1974; Kripke, 1972; Putnam, 1967, 1988). Classically, multiple realizability has been used in
metaphysical debates such as identity-theories vs. functionalism, or in the context of theory reduction. Here, we use it in a different way: ToCs need to offer
a gauge to determine whether or not a given system is conscious.
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Word, they are not necessary. Likewise, ToCs that explain
consciousness by pointing to certain brain regions or char-
acteristics claimed to be sufficient for consciousness need
to explain why they are also necessary for consciousness.
Hence, our fourth criterion asks whether ToCs can
make clear-cut and specific predictions about which
other systems are conscious, apart from humans. If
they cannot, they are subject to the other systems argu-
ment. If they are subject to the argument, how do they
cope with it? Do they claim that only humans are con-
scious? Otherwise, they are not necessary for conscious-
ness. It is possible for a ToC that lacks the specificity, in
its current form, to address the other-systems criterion
to later be able to address the criterion after becoming
more mechanistically precise.
IV. Facing up to the criteria
Guided by the criteria of the last section, we use the
most prototypical ToCs to work out leitmotifs in
argumentation, which are dominant in consciousness
research. A quick synopsis tries to capture the essentials
of these ToCs. More ToCs are described in the appendix.
Our analysis is summarized in Table 1. We are aware of
the shortcomings of such a minimalistic approach. First,
such a review cannot be exhaustive because so much
has been said about consciousness (it is potentially
quicker to list phenomena to which consciousness has
not been linked). Still, we think that ToCs not portrayed
have much in common in argumentation with the por-
trayed ToCs. Second, we are very much aware that it is
impossible to perfectly portray a ToC in a few lines
because these theories are complex, multi-faceted and
have seen many updates. For this reason, we are not
interested in minute details of specific ToCs. Once more,
we are more interested in prototypic argumentations
than in an encyclopedia of ToCs. For this reason, we do
not wish to imply that when ToCs cannot cope with one
of the criteria they should be dismissed. There might be
simply fixes. Our aim is to make challenges explicit and
Table 1. Summary of how ToCs cope with our criteria. The classification presented here should be seen as
our interpretation, and aims to foster discussion. Top: Criteria. Green indicates that a ToC successfully copes
with the associated criterion, red that it does not. Orange boxes indicate that the ToC faces either the small
network or the other systems argument, depending on how one interprets the ToC. This is due to loosely
defined mechanisms: if the mechanism is interpreted as a straightforward computational mechanism (such as
a simple implementation of higher-order ‘thoughts’ in a 2-stage network), the small network argument arises. If
instead the mechanism is a complex process found only in the human brain (for example ‘thought’ understood
as a brain process), the other systems kicks in. We propose that theories with orange boxes may be unable to
simultaneously avoid the small network and other systems arguments. Details are given in the corresponding
parts of section IV and in the appendix. Theories are described in section IV or in the Appendix. Bottom: The
scope of theories. Light green indicates that the ToC explicitly addresses the associated empirical character-
istic of consciousness. Light red means it does not. The empirical characteristics are described in section II. As
mentioned, ToCs are not always explicit about the scope of what they address and what exactly they aim to
explain. For this reason, the above table partly reflects our own understanding of ToCs. In addition, different
versions and interpretations of a ToC can change the above classifications. This table can be seen as an
invitation to discuss, take sides and make commitments. Theory acronyms: NDT – Neural Darwinisn Theory,
Orch OR – Orchestrated Objective Reduction, IIT – Information Integration Theory, RPT – Recurrent Processing
Theory, GWT – Global Workspace Theory, HOTT – Higher Order Thought Theory, PPT – Predictive Processing
Theory, ART – Adaptive Resonance Theory, TLT – Thalamocortical Loop Theory, NMDA – NMDA Theory, AST –
Attention Schema Theory, SMT – Sensorimotor Theory, SCMT – Self Comes to Mind Theory.
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thus foster discussion about how best to deal with them.
The various subsections can be read independently and,
thus, hurried readers can pick their ToCs of interest and
skip others.
IV.1. Theories challenged by criterion I: Paradigm
cases of consciousness
IV.1.a. Linking consciousness to a cognitive process
Synopsis. Many cognitive processes have been linked to
consciousness including learning (Cleeremans, 2007;
Cleeremans et al., 2019), body ownership (Faivre et al.,
2015), language (Gazzaniga, 1970), integrated and ego-
centric encoding of the world (Barron & Klein, 2016) and
homoeostatic bodily responses (Critchley et al., 2004), to
name a few. Some ToCs are not explicit as to whether
the proposed cognitive process is necessary for con-
sciousness, sufficient, or both. Other ToCs assert that
the proposed cognitive process is necessary but not
sufficient for consciousness (e.g. Cleeremans, 2007).
Others identify consciousness with the proposed cogni-
tive process, which is taken to be necessary and suffi-
cient (Barron & Klein, 2016). Typically, the evidence for
linking these cognitive processes to consciousness relies
on the fact that they seem to always be associated with
consciousness. Importantly, none of these proposals
address paradigm cases. Hence for these types of ToCs,
it is important to show that consciousness itself and not
merely co-occurring processes are addressed. Even
though there is a link to consciousness, it needs to be
shown that the link is not merely contingent. There may
even be double dissociations. For example, language
seems neither necessary nor sufficient in order to con-
sciously perceive a patch of colour.
Example: Subjectivity and the Hermann-Hering Grid: As
an illustration, consider the illusory ghost spots in the
Hermann-Hering Grid (Figure 4). They might be taken
to reflect consciousness since they are purely subjec-
tive, i.e., only in the eye of the beholder. However, since
there is no unconscious alternative, there is no reason
to link the ghost spots to consciousness rather than
other co-occurring processes. In fact, the illusory spots
could be explained by simple facts of retinal processing
(Figure 4, Baumgartner, 1978). Recent explanations of
the ghost spots rely on basic cortical processing
(Blakeslee & McCourt, 2012), but we present here the
simpler retinal explanation to illustrate how subjective
effects can in theory arise independently of conscious-
ness. More generally, for consciousness, it does not
matter if there are real spots in the outer world causing
a percept (distal stimulus) or if the retina or basic
cortical processing ‘creates’ these spots instead
(proximal stimulus). To illustrate this with a simpler
example: imagine a person holding up two fingers
and, then, there is a change to five fingers. The content
of consciousness has changed but clearly this experi-
ment does not tell us anything about consciousness
since it was not the dependent variable: the observer
was always conscious. What has changed are states of
the outer world and accordingly trivially the content of
perception and consciousness. The Hermann-Hering
grid is simply an instance of non-veridical perception
discussed in the context of consciousness. When
a percept does not correspond to the ‘objective’ reality,
consciousness may seem to be involved, but this
impression is usually mistaken. Illusions and altered
states of consciousness (under the effect of psychotro-
pic substances for instance) face similar issues: it does
not matter for consciousness how an illusion or the
contents of an altered state of consciousness are cre-
ated by the brain. The question is why these contents –
and not others – are consciously perceived? There cer-
tainly is a change in content, but consciousness per se
cannot be shown to change.
Figure 4. The Hermann-Hering Grid. Black spots are perceived at
the intersections of the white strips. Because these ghost spots
are subjective, it seems they are directly linked to consciousness.
However, the occurrence of the spots may be explained by basic
retinal or cortical processing. An on-centre neuron fires more
strongly to a white line than to two intersecting white lines
because there is less inhibition in the first case, explaining why
the spots are perceived only for the latter case. Receptive fields
of two on-centre neurons are shown here. The more light falls in
the red periphery of these neurons’ receptive fields, the less they
fire. More recent explanations of the ghost spots rely on basic
cortical processing (Blakeslee & McCourt, 2012), but we present
here the simpler retinal explanation to illustrate how subjective
effects can in theory arise independently of consciousness.
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Example: Body Ownership and the rubber hand illusion. In
the rubber hand illusion, participants can be tricked into
attributing ownership of their real hand to a fake rubber
hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). They feel like the fake
hand is their hand. There is no unconscious alternative,
since the participant is having a conscious ownership
experience the whole time. The experience simply
changes from owning the real hand to owning the rub-
ber one. The rubber hand illusion has been used to study
consciousness (Faivre et al., 2015). However, since there
is no unconscious alternative, the situation is similar to
the Hermann-Hering grid and the fingers examples men-
tioned above. There certainly is a change in body repre-
sentation, but consciousness per se is not shown to
change.
In summary, the main challenge for these theories
linking consciousness to a cognitive process is that,
because they do not address paradigm cases, they may
not address consciousness per se but instead other co-
occurring processes. These ToCs need to make explicit
why they are about consciousness per se.
IV.1.b. Linking consciousness to a neural or physical
process
Synopsis. Many theories identify consciousness with
neural or physical processes. For example, neural feature
binding has been proposed as the key feature of con-
sciousness, and this binding has been explained by
neural synchrony or re-entrant processing (Edelman,
2003; Grossberg, 2017; Llinas et al., 1998; Singer, 2007).
One of the most well-known theories linking conscious-
ness to neural binding is Edelman’s (2003) Neural
Darwinism Theory (NDT). As a quantum physical exam-
ple, Penrose and Hameroff’s Orchestrated Objective
Reduction (Orch OR; Hameroff & Penrose, 2014) theory
links consciousness with understanding, and then links
understanding to quantum mechanical processes. Orch
OR faces similar challenges as NDT (see appendix).
Example: Neural Darwinism Theory (NDT). NDT proposes
that the crucial property of consciousness is to bind
neural information into a unitary percept. This claim is
based on the observation that conscious states are
highly diverse, yet always unified. Binding is proposed
as the mechanism to create these diverse and unified
conscious states and is explained in terms of assemblies
of neurons firing synchronously in the thalamocortical
system. Which neurons fire together is determined by
a selectionist mechanism, called Neural Darwinism: cir-
cuits that give rise to useful percepts are selected and
strengthened through epigenetic and synaptic plasticity.
These synchronous neural assemblies are proposed to
be in 1–1 correspondence with conscious states.
Similarly to the approaches linking consciousness to
a cognitive process, NDT does not have an unconscious
alternative. Indeed, binding occurs in both conscious
and unconscious processing. For example, unconscious
priming can occur at the object level (James et al., 2000),
suggesting that parts can be bound into wholes uncon-
sciously. Therefore, binding cannot be used to study
differences between conscious and unconscious alter-
natives in paradigm cases.
In summary, since there is no unconscious alternative,
an important challenge for NDT is to show that it really
targets consciousness per se rather than perception in
general (III.1).
IV.2. Theories challenged by criterion II: The
unfolding argument
IV.2.a. Causal structure theories
Synopsis. Theories that address paradigm cases aim to
predict changes from the unconscious to the conscious
alternative in experimental paradigms. In order to do
so, several ToCs focus on how elements of a system
interact. If the system has the ‘right’ kind of causal
structure, i.e., if its elements interact in the ‘right’ way,
it is conscious. Otherwise, it is not. The two most well-
known examples are Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT;
Lamme, 2006) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT;
Tononi, 2004). Causal structure theories need to
address the unfolding argument and often the small
network argument. In the following, we present IIT
as an example. RPT faces similar challenges (see
appendix).
Example: Integrated Information Theory (IIT). IIT was first
proposed by Tononi (2004). The theory starts with a set
of five axioms proposed to capture the phenomenologi-
cal properties of consciousness. The unity of conscious-
ness (II.3.b) is an axiom, for example. These axioms are
translated into mathematical postulates, from which it is
derived that consciousness corresponds to integrated
information. The amount of information integrated by
a system, and therefore its level of consciousness, is
quantified by a number: Φ. Importantly, Φ is computed
based on the causal structure of the system. In particular,
feedforward networks always have Φ = 0 and recurrent
networks always have Φ > 0. When several subsystems
have Φ > 0, the unitary consciousness of the system as
a whole is determined by the subsystem with the max-
imal Φ.
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IIT addresses both state and content paradigm cases
of consciousness. Conscious states occur if and only if
Φ > 0 (so unconscious states occur when Φ = 0). For
conscious content, a feature (e.g., the target in a masking
experiment) is consciously perceived if its representation
contributes to the network that determines Φ > 0. The
unconscious alternative for conscious contents occurs
when the feature of interest is not represented in the
network that determines Φ > 0. IIT is perhaps the current
theory that copes best with the other systems argument,
making precise quantitative predictions about which
systems are conscious, how much, and even which con-
scious contents are perceived.
Like all other causal structure theories, IIT is subject to
the unfolding argument (III.2) because systems with iden-
tical input-output functions can have Φ = 0 or arbitrarily
high Φ. The unfolding argument also shows that systems
with identical input-output functions can have arbitrary
conscious content, according to IIT (Doerig, Schurger,
et al., 2019). For example, a system participating in
a rivalry experiment may report that it is seeing the cat
image from Figure 1 when, according to IIT, it is experien-
cing the smell of ham. In principle, it can experience any
content of consciousness while reporting that it sees a cat.
IIT also faces the small network argument (III.3).
Proponents of the theory accept that two recurrently
connected neurons are indeed conscious and accept
panpsychism (Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi & Koch,
2015). The criterion determining which systems are con-
scious is Φ > 0. However, this criterion is at least partly
arbitrary, since the axioms do not uniquely specify the
complexity measure, i.e., other measures thanΦ fulfil the
axioms as well (Bayne, 2018), but lead to very different
empirical results (Mediano et al., 2019). Moreover, IIT also
faces the ‘large network argument’ (III.3.d). For example,
gravitational interactions between celestial objects in
a galaxy integrate information and therefore have
Φ > 0. Consciousness is attributed only to the subsystem
with the highest Φ locally. Since a system always has
larger or equal Φ than any of its subsystems (either the
subsystem is the local maximum of Φ or it is lower than
that), depending on how we interpret ‘locally’, only the
Universe has consciousness because it has the highestΦ.
IIT needs a criterion for differentiating subsystems.
In summary, the main challenge for IIT is that the
unfolding argument suggests that the theory cannot
address empirical data about the state nor about the
content of consciousness. IIT needs to show how it can
deal with the unfolding argument. In this respect, see
Tsuchiya et al. (2020) and Kleiner (2019) who defend IIT
from the unfolding argument. Moreover, IIT faces the
small and large network arguments. It embraces panpsy-
chism and proposes a criterion for determining which
small networks are conscious, but this criterion is at least
partly arbitrary. IIT also needs a more precise criterion for
large systems.
IV.3. Theories challenged by criterion III: The small/
large network argument
IV.3.a. Computational theories
Synopsis. Many important ToCs are of a computational
nature. These theories have several advantages: they
address paradigm cases, fit comfortably within the mod-
ern information processing framework of neuroscience
and often deal convincingly with the unfolding and the
other systems arguments. However, they need to deal
with the small network argument. We present two of the
leading ToCs, Global Workspace Theory and Higher
Order Thought Theory as examples. Two other ToCs,
Predictive Processing Theory and Adaptive Resonance
Theory are presented in the appendix.
Example: Global Workspace Theory (GWT). GWT was first
put forward by Bernard Baars (Baars, 1993; Baars et al.,
2013). Dehaene and collegues subsequently proposed
the global neuronal workspace theory (Dehaene &
Naccache, 2001; Mashour et al., 2020). GWT postulates
that conscious experiences reflect a flexible binding and
broadcasting function in the brain. That is, peripheral
coalitions of neurons compete in a winner-take-all fash-
ion and the winner broadcasts information to the whole
brain, thus binding features of different modalities into
a coherent conscious percept. ‘To be consciously acces-
sible, information must be encoded as an organized
pattern of neuronal activity in higher cortical regions,
and this pattern must, in turn, ignite an inner circle of
tightly interconnected areas forming a global work-
space’ (Dehaene, 2014). For example, different interpre-
tations of a visual scene may compete until a winner is
globally ‘broadcast’, giving rise to a unified conscious
experience. In its simplest version, the global workspace
model comprises peripheral neurons that project to cen-
tral neurons, which in turn bind information together
and broadcast this information to the entire network.
GWT addresses paradigm cases including the atten-
tional blink (Sergent et al., 2005), masking (Dehaene
et al., 2001), and wakefulness vs. sleep (Dehaene et al.,
2003). The broadcasting mechanism has conscious
and unconscious alternatives. For example, in mask-
ing, it was found that activity spreads more in the
cortex when the target is consciously perceived than
when it is not. The explanation is that the target
becomes conscious when it enters the workspace
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and remains unconscious when the mask prevents the
target from entering the workspace. GWT is not sub-
ject to the unfolding argument because broadcasting
is a general concept, which can be implemented in
many different ways (even though GWT is usually
framed in recurrent terms, recurrence is not essential,
Doerig, Schurger, et al., 2019; but see Kleiner, 2019;
Kleiner & Hoel, 2020). GWT copes with the other sys-
tems argument by proposing that systems endowed
with a global workspace architecture are conscious.
The small network argument applies because the
global workspace architecture and broadcasting can be
realized with very few neurons. For example, a network
consisting of two peripheral neurons connected to
a small recurrent global workspace fulfils the criteria for
consciousness proposed by GWT. Proponents of GWT do
not usually concede and grant consciousness to these
small networks, so additional criteria are needed to
explain why they are not conscious. As explained in
section III.3.b, simple addendums cannot fix the pro-
blem, so something crucial seems to be missing from
the theory.
Moreover, billions of subsystems in the brain have
a GW architecture so GWT faces the large network argu-
ment (III.3.d). Another additional criterion is needed to
decide which one of them gives rise to our seemingly
unitary conscious experience, or GWT needs to give up
the unity of consciousness. Finally, the need for addi-
tional criteria is also highlighted by the existence of
systems such as the immune and the vegetative nervous
systems, which can also be seen as having a GW struc-
ture with broadcasting but are not granted conscious-
ness by GWT.
In summary, the main challenge for GWT seems to be
that it grants consciousness to too many systems.
Therefore, GWT needs to provide criteria to cope with
the small (and large) network argument.
Example: Higher Order Thought Theory (HOTT). HOTT is
another popular theory subject to the same kind of
challenges as GWT. While HOTT originated in philoso-
phical circles (Rosenthal, 1986, 2002) and has mostly
been couched in cognitive terms, it has more recently
made its way into the arena of neuroscientific theories of
consciousness (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). There are a few
variants of higher-order theories of consciousness
(Brown et al., 2019; Lau, 2019; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011;
Rosenthal, 2004) but the gist of HOTT is this: A mental
state X is conscious if, and only if, one has a higher-order
representation to the effect that one is currently repre-
senting X. One prominent neuroscientific take on HOTT
posits that specific areas of pre-frontal cortex involved in
metacognition are directly involved in the formation of
higher-order thoughts (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). HOTT
can be contrasted with first-order theories such as IIT,
which posit that consciousness of X depends only on the
first-order neural representation of X.
HOTT addresses paradigm cases of consciousness
such as visual masking (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). There
are conscious and unconscious alternatives, depend-
ing on whether or not the relevant higher-order
thoughts occur. In the example of masking, there is
usually a higher-order thought to the effect that one
perceives the mask (subjects usually report being con-
scious of the mask in masking experiments), but no
higher-order thought that one perceives the stimulus
that is masked.
HOTT faces different challenges depending on how
it is interpreted, because different authors have differ-
ent takes on what exactly constitutes a higher order
thought (compare for instance Lau (2019) and
Rosenthal (2002)). Depending on the interpretation,
either the small network or the other systems argu-
ments may apply. At one extreme, if we interpret
higher order thoughts as a simple 2-stage computation,
HOTT is subject to the small network argument
because any 2-stage computer program is conscious.
In this case, HOTT needs to propose criteria to distin-
guish which systems are conscious and to explain
which subsystems of the brain contribute to our see-
mingly unitary conscious experience. At the other
extreme, higher order thoughts may simply refer to
the everyday concept of human thinking. In this case,
HOTT is not a computational theory and the other
systems argument applies: HOTT needs to explain
what is crucial to be a ‘thought’ and which systems
can have equivalents to ‘thoughts’ and be conscious,
apart from humans. These extreme interpretations of
HOTT illustrate why intermediate interpretations may
face a mix of the small network and other systems
arguments.
Since there is currently no clear-cut mechanism, it is
difficult to say to what extent these arguments apply
but, eventually, HOTT will need to include a specific
mechanism that can cope with both the other systems
and the small network argument.
IV.4. Theories challenged by criterion IV: The other
systems argument
IV.4.a. Biological theories
Synopsis. Many studies have investigated the neural corre-
lates of consciousness (Koch et al., 2016; Rees et al., 2002).
For example, brain areas correlating with the conscious
percept in binocular rivalry were found (Tong et al.,
12 A. DOERIG ET AL.
1998). However, in general, correlates cannot tell about the
underlying causes and mechanisms. Quite a few research-
ers went further and identified certain biological properties
of the brain as essential for consciousness. Examples
include NMDA synapses (Flohr, 1992), processing in layer
5 of V1 (Crick & Koch, 2003), the claustrum (Crick & Koch,
2005), gamma-band oscillations (Buzsáki, 2004), thalamo-
cortical loops (Llinas et al., 1998), or the microgenesis of
consciousness in the thalamus (Bachmann, 2000). In gen-
eral, these theories need to address the other systems
argument because they focus only on consciousness in
humans and cannot tell which other systems may be con-
scious. We portray Llinas’ Thalamocortical Loops Theory
(TLT) as an example.
Example: Thalamocortical Loops Theory (TLT). Llinas et al.
(1998) link consciousness to neural binding. The proposed
mechanism involves gamma-band oscillations in thalamo-
cortical loops, which bind information from different mod-
alities by synchronizing the firing of neurons. Different
cortical regions represent different contents, which are
bound into a unitary conscious percept by gamma band
oscillations. The intralaminar nucleus in the thalamus gen-
erates the oscillation. Accordingly, it has been observed
that damage to the intralaminar nucleus leads to coma.
Consciousness is temporally discrete because the gamma
oscillations create conscious snapshots (Joliot et al., 1994).
TLT links consciousness to neural binding, addresses
paradigm cases and proposes an unconscious alterna-
tive. For example, the difference between wakefulness
and dreamless sleep (a paradigm case) is explained by
a difference in the amplitude of the thalamocortical
oscillations. High amplitude corresponds to the con-
scious and low amplitude to the unconscious alternative.
The other systems argument applies: what is really
necessary for consciousness in the thalamocortical sys-
tem? Even if it is true that removing the thalamocortical
system from adult humans renders them unconscious,
a sentient being without a thalamocortical system may
still possess consciousness because his brain may imple-
ment the crucial functions fulfilled by the thalamocorti-
cal system in a different way. Moreover, the unfolding
argument opens up the possibility that other implemen-
tations of the thalamocortical system are possible.
In summary, TLT faces the other systems argument
and needs to explain what is special about the thalamo-
cortical system.
IV.4.b. Cognitive theories
Synopsis. Certain theories propose a cognitive
mechanism for consciousness. These theories are
usually not subject to the unfolding argument and
small network argument because their mechanisms
are very complex, involving, for example, language
or attention. The price paid is that the mechanisms
are usually vaguely described, provoking the other
systems argument. These theories are different from
theories in section IV.1, because, rather than merely
linking consciousness with a cognitive process, they
provide an explanation of how the proposed cognitive
mechanism differentiates between conscious and
unconscious alternatives. Here, we portray the
Attention Schema Theory (AST) as an example.
O’Regan and Noë's (2001) Action Percetion Loop
Theory and Damasio’s (2010) Self Comes to Mind
Theory are presented in the appendix.
Example: Attention Schema Theory (AST). According to
AST, the brain is equipped to model the attention of
others via cues, such as gaze direction and body lan-
guage. This modelling mechanism is used to infer the
mental state of others and to predict their behavior. Here
‘attention’ is defined in general terms as the highlighting
of a subset of all currently available neural information
for more in-depth processing. The focus of attention can,
in any given instance, be directed exogenously at spe-
cific sensory information or endogenously at a memory
or fantasy that one is currently entertaining. Not having
direct access to the physical processes that underlie the
directing of attention in the brains of others, the brain
represents the attention controller as something ethe-
real that we come to know as ‘consciousness’ residing in
others. When this same model is turned inwards and
used to describe our own attention-directing mechan-
ism, we come to attribute consciousness to ourselves.
With notable exceptions, every bit of neural information
to which we direct our attention becomes tagged with
a special attribute, an ineffable ‘something extra’, that
we have come to know as qualia. Thus, just as the brain
maintains a body schema, which continuously models
the relative position of one’s body parts in space, the
brain also maintains an ‘attention schema’ which con-
tinuously models one’s current state of attention.
According to the theory, consciousness and qualia are
perceptual attributions, not fundamentally different
from other perceptual attributions such as color or tex-
ture. According to Graziano, the temporo-parietal junc-
tion is a central hub in the implementation of the
attention schema in the human brain.
AST is special because it is the only explicitly illusionist
theory reviewed here. Illusionists usually argue against
metaphysical ideas about the nature of consciousness,
mainly against the existence of qualia as distinct non-
physical entities (see Section I). If AST or other illusionist
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ToCs argue only at this metaphysical level, our criteria do
not apply. However, if AST seeks empirical support from
data about consciousness (i.e., if it purports to explain
masking, sleep, etc.), our criteria apply.
The proposed mechanism, i.e., the modeling of
attention, can address paradigm cases of conscious-
ness in principle: There are both conscious and
unconscious alternatives, depending on whether
information is modeled by the attention schema.
Content paradigm cases are addressed by looking
at which contents are the subject of attention mod-
elled by the attention schema. Different states of
consciousness could be explained by different states
of the modeling process. Since AST is not a causal
structure theory, it does not face the unfolding argu-
ment. AST requires that the system generates
a model of what attention is (i.e., it must describe
attention as something ethereal that we come to
know as ‘consciousness’) not just what attention is
pointed at. This plausibly requires a reasonable level
of complexity, so the small network argument seems
not to apply.
AST currently does not provide a clear-cut description
of its mechanism, which leads to the other systems
argument. The main question is: what defines attention
modelling? If there is no computational explanation of
what really counts as attention modeling, the other
systems problem arises: what is crucial for consciousness
in the human implementation of attention modelling?
Which other systems have it and are thus predicted to be
conscious? One issue for AST in coping with the other
system argument is that, if attention modelling is
defined computationally (for example as maps repre-
senting where enhanced information processing
occurs), the small network argument may pose
a problem. Eventually, AST will need a specific mechan-
ism that can satisfy the other-systems criterion without
conjuring up the small network argument.
V. Discussion
Modern neuroscience has developed many tools and
paradigms to investigate consciousness empirically
(masking, rivalry, crowding, continuous flash suppres-
sion, anaesthesia, . . .), and many more may come.
Through these phenomena, consciousness can, at
least partly, be addressed as any other scientific
topic, leaving metaphysical questions aside. In paral-
lel, a puzzling plethora of ToCs were proposed. We
suggest that this exuberance of different theories
points to a lack of stringent criteria in consciousness
science.3 Consequently, the major goal of this contri-
bution is to put forward a list of criteria that empirical
ToCs need to address.
As mentioned, we do not claim to have fully
described the many facets of the theories we reviewed.
In addition, we do not propose that ToCs challenged by
our criteria should be discarded. To the contrary, our
analysis is meant to explicitly formulate these chal-
lenges and, in this way, to provide a common frame-
work to discuss and compare ToCs systematically. We
do not propose that the criteria are exhaustive and
unique. To the contrary, we see this contribution as
a steppingstone to develop agreed-upon criteria that
foster theory evaluation and selection. Further criteria
may be added and proposed criteria may be modified
or dropped. In the following we classify ToCs in four
classes, depending on how they cope with our four
major criteria.
V.1 Class I: ToCs that do not address paradigm
cases of consciousness
A first, large class of ToCs addresses consciousness only
indirectly via phenomena proposed to be identical or
closely associated with consciousness (see NDT and Orch
OR, Table 1). As we have shown, most of these ToCs first
motivate why the proposed phenomenon is crucial for
or identical with consciousness and then work out the
details of the phenomenon rather than the details of
consciousness. These ToCs usually do not address para-
digm cases of consciousness. For this reason, it is not
always clear whether the proposed phenomenon is in
fact linked with consciousness at all. Sometimes the link
can be described as a mystery meeting another mystery.
To quote Pinker (2007), ‘[Q]uantum mechanics sure is
weird, and consciousness sure is weird, so maybe quan-
tum mechanics can explain consciousness’. Class I ToCs
need to specify whether the proposed phenomenon is
necessary, sufficient, or only linked to consciousness,
and clarify why and how. It is important to show that
consciousness is really addressed, and not only a co-
occurring process.
V.2. Class II: ToCs that are subject to the unfolding
argument
ToCs of class II identify consciousness with causal struc-
tures (see IIT and RPT, Table 1). In some way, these ToCs
locate consciousness on the level of hardware rather than
software. These theories address paradigm cases and
certain characteristics of consciousness, such as unity.
3On top of a potential lack of criteria, Lau and Michel (2019) propose a socio-historical take on this question.
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They provide clear cut mechanisms proposed to be
necessary and sufficient, and make quantitative predic-
tions about the empirical characteristics of consciousness
listed in section II. However, these ToCs are challenged by
the unfolding argument because they imply that empiri-
cally identical systems have different consciousness. Any
function can be implemented by many different systems
with different causal structures. Hence, it seems that there
can be no consistent link between causal structures and
experimental results. Proposing simple, clear cut causal
structures as sufficient for consciousness seems to open
the door too wide. This is also the reason why the small
and large network arguments apply. Hence, class II ToCs
need to address and clarify how they can cope with the
unfolding and small network arguments or why they
refute these criteria.
V.3. Class III: ToCs that are subject to the small
network argument
Class III ToCs propose that computational aspects are
identical with consciousness (see GWT, HOTT, PPT and
ART, Table 1). These ToCs address paradigm cases,
address the empirical characteristics of consciousness
listed in section II and usually successfully deal with the
unfolding and other systems arguments because they
are independent of the specific implementation and
apply to any type of creature. However, they seem to
fall prey to the small (and large) network argument
because they are too unconstrained, and hence apply
to too many systems. Hence, the proposed mechanisms
do not seem sufficient and therefore additional criteria
are required (section III.3.b). The extent to which the
proposed mechanism is crucial for consciousness needs
to be demonstrated.
V.4. Class IV: ToCs that are subject to the other
systems argument
ToCs of Class IVa identify consciousness with biological
processes. Some ToCs propose that certain biological
systems or processes are crucial for consciousness (see
TLT and NMDA, Table 1). ToCs of Class IVb identify con-
sciousness with cognitive processes (see AST, SMT and
SCMT, Table 1).
Class IV ToCs address paradigm cases by specifying
how the candidate process plays a crucial role in the
transition from unconsciousness to consciousness. Most
of these ToCs avoid the unfolding and the small (and
large) network arguments because they attribute con-
sciousness mainly to humans instead of proposing
a clear-cut mechanism applicable to any system.
However, for this reason, the other systems argument
kicks in, and it is difficult for these ToCs to address the
empirical characteristics of consciousness presented in
section II. One way out of this problem is to provide
a precise computational formulation of the proposed
biological or computational process. However, in this
case, the ToC becomes a class III theory and the small
network argument may apply.
VI. Conclusions
The many ToCs in classes II–IV directly address con-
sciousness through paradigm cases. In general, it is
important for each ToC to unearth the common charac-
teristics of paradigm cases (Chalmers, 1996; Fingelkurts
et al., 2012; Haynes, 2009; Seth, 2016). Whether we have
sufficient data, experimental paradigms, etc., at the
moment remains an open question. Maybe the plethora
of ToCs simply reflects the fact that we have too few
experimental constraints. It is possible that with more
data and a more detailed view of the subprocesses of
consciousness, the mystery will evaporate, similarly to
what happened with the discussion about the ‘nature’ of
life. Nowadays biologists understand what life is, but
there is no ‘theory of life’ (Machery, 2012). It is the
entirety of subprocesses such as homeostasis, reproduc-
tion, etc., that differentiates life from non-life.
Current ToCs do not take this approach. Instead,
a characteristic of all ToCs is that they seemingly identify
consciousness with something else. To illustrate this
with a metaphor: Banksy is a street artist whose private
identity is unknown. It may be your neighbour. You
know there is a street artist and you know your neigh-
bour, but you do not know that they are identical
(Kripke, 1972). Similarly, all ToCs suggest that conscious-
ness is identical to something we know already and
propose to elucidate the link between the two.
Consciousness is not something ‘new’. ToCs differ in
what they identify with consciousness. For example,
GWT identifies broadcasting with consciousness, IIT
identifies systems with Φ > 0 with consciousness, and
AST identifies the modelling of attention with
consciousness.4 One difficulty is that identifying con-
sciousness with clear cut mechanisms such as recurrence
or a mathematical definition of integrated information
easily leads to the small network or the unfolding argu-
ment. Relatedly, a theory explaining rivalry, masking and
sleep is a theory of the three but not necessarily a theory
of consciousness. As soon as a concrete model is pro-
posed, the small network argument becomes
4Even though AST is an illusionist theory, it still identifies the illusion of consciousness with modelling attention.
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threatening and the question arises whether a small
system implementing this model is conscious – which
is nothing other than the hard problem of conscious-
ness. Vague mechanisms camouflage this issue. Perhaps
for this reason, ToCs often identify consciousness with
a rather vague, metaphorical or little understood aspect,
such as models of attention, complexity, neural binding,
or quantum states. In this line, it is not surprising that
few ToCs make detailed predictions and are therefore
difficult to compare. In short, identifying consciousness
with something precise leads to a slippery slope with the
small network and unfolding arguments at the bottom,
and identifying consciousness with a vaguer property
makes it difficult to make detailed predictions and to
cope with the other systems argument. Although it may
turn out that these hurdles can be overcome so that
identifying consciousness with a known phenomenon
will ultimately succeed, we propose that these chal-
lenges are serious and must be confronted.
Another option is that consciousness is something
‘new’. The current situation in consciousness research
may be similar to that of magnetism in ancient times.
The ancient people of Greece, India and China knew the
empirical phenomena of magnetism. For example,
Thales knew that certain stones could move certain
other objects and attributed this power to souls residing
in the magnetic stones. For two millennia, there was no
widely accepted theoretical explanation or definition,
and the discussion might have resembled what we
encounter nowadays in consciousness research: either
magnetism was deemed fundamentally mysterious or it
was identified with known entities (e.g., linking magnets
and souls). Likewise, consciousness is most often
explained by entities and theories of today, such as
neural, cognitive, or computational processes.
However, just like consciousness, magnetism was well
‘defined’ empirically, e.g., by the attraction or repulsion
between magnetic stones, compasses, etc. After centu-
ries of research, and despite the lack of rigid definitions
to start with, magnetism has lost its mysteries through
the Maxwell equations and subsequent theories of elec-
tro-magnetism, which provided a clear scientific expla-
nation (see Dennett, 1991, p. 44). To explain magnetism,
it was necessary to understand other phenomena, such
as electricity, beforehand. Maybe consciousness is
a ‘solution’, a by-product, or a core component of
a computational challenge that information processing
systems need to solve – and that we have not discov-
ered yet.
Whatever the final answer to these questions is,
theoretical frameworks clarifying the link between
empirical data and ToCs are crucial in order to com-
pare theories and make progress in consciousness
science. The criteria we propose are intended as
a first set of guidelines to foster discussions about
consciousness as an empirical phenomenon.
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Appendix
Linking consciousness to neural or physical processes
Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch OR). Based on
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, the Orchestrated
Objective Reduction (Orch OR) theory by Penrose and
Hameroff proposes that mental aspects such as under-
standing, free will or insight, are not Turing machine
computable (Penrose, 1999). Hence, a non-computable
mechanism must be at work. Penrose proposed the objec-
tive reduction (OR) of quantum wave functions, which has
an inherently non-computable stochastic component. OR
events are proto-conscious moments, without meaning or
information. Proto-conscious OR events are proposed to
be a basic property of the entire universe. A minimal
moment of consciousness occurs every time an OR event
occurs. However, these OR events are usually not orga-
nized, like individual instruments in an orchestra being
tuned: noise rather than music. In the brain, OR events
do not occur at random. Instead, microtubules ‘orches-
trate’ (Orch) OR events in such a way that meaningful
conscious moments emerge, resulting in Orch OR
moments of full, rich conscious experience (music rather
than noise). In this way, human consciousness corresponds
to Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch OR) events.
Orch OR events are not functionally inert: they are pro-
posed to select particular classical states of microtubules
which then govern neuronal function, e.g., regulating axo-
nal firing to exert causal action on behavior.
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Orch OR links putatively non-computable phenomena such
as free will, creativity, insight and understanding to conscious-
ness. A quantum mechanism explains these cognitive phe-
nomena. There is evidence that terahertz quantum vibrations
in microtubules are dampened during anaesthesia (Burdick
et al., 2019). However, this does not support the link between
consciousness and OR. Indeed, Orch OR probably also occurs in
unconscious processing. Hence, there is no unconscious alter-
native, so Orch OR cannot address paradigm cases.
Furthermore, quantum effects in anaesthesia may simply
alter neural processing without any link between OR and con-
sciousness. As a side comment, it is also far from consensual
that Orch OR events can occur at all in the brain or that they
can explain cognitive effects (but see Hameroff & Penrose,
2014).
In summary, because it does not address paradigm cases,
Orch OR needs to explain why it targets consciousness per se.
Causal structure theories
Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT). Lamme (2006) argued that
a neural description of consciousness is needed because
reportability might not always be adequate for measuring
consciousness. For this reason, he proposed that conscious-
ness can simply be measured by whether or not recurrent
processing is present. In vision for example, there is first
a forward sweep of information processing that occurs uncon-
sciously. Consciousness emerges when subsequent recurrent
processing allows different specialized visual regions to com-
municate. The idea motivating this identification of conscious-
ness with recurrent processing is the following: it was shown
that recurrent processing is required for perceptual organiza-
tion and grouping (Lamme et al., 1998), which are functions
that, it is argued, are explicitly linked to conscious experience
(Lamme, 2015). For this reason, RPT proposes that recurrent
processing is necessary and sufficient for consciousness, mak-
ing it a causal structure theory.
RPT addresses paradigm cases (masking for example in
Lamme, 2006), and recurrent processing is a mechanism with
both conscious (there is recurrent processing) and unconscious
(there is no recurrent processing) alternatives. The other sys-
tems argument does not apply: other systems are conscious
when they process information recurrently.
The unfolding argument (III.2) suggests that there may be
a double dissociation between RPT and paradigm cases of
consciousness because any computational task performed by
a recurrent network can be carried out identically by feedfor-
ward networks. The small network argument (III.3) arises since
a two-neuron network can implement recurrent processing
and should therefore be conscious, leading to a sort of panpsy-
chism. For the same reason, RPT also needs to address the
large network argument (III.3.d).
In summary, RPT needs to explain how it copes with the
unfolding and small network arguments.
Computational Theories
Predictive Processing Theory (PPT). The brain is often seen as
a predictive processing machine (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010;
Rao & Ballard, 1999). The idea is that the brain uses
a generative model to explain its input stream with
a complex web of top-down predictions. For example, if
a dog excites the retina, the generative model predicts what
the retinal activation looks like, and how it will change.
Failures to predict the sensory input result in prediction
errors, and top-down predictions try to cancel these error
signals. We experience a structured world with dogs, cats,
houses, and even abstract entities such as parliaments or
mental states because they are contents of the generative
model. Predictive processing has often been associated with
consciousness (Friston, 2013; Rudrauf et al., 2017; Seth &
Tsakiris, 2018). For example, Rudrauf et al. (2017) identify
core aspects of consciousness with a set specific computa-
tional mechanisms, of which predictive processing is para-
mount (3D spatial phenomenology of subjective experiences
also plays an important role in their model, but we focus here
on the predictive processing component of the model).
PPT addresses paradigm cases such as binocular rivalry for
example: only one image at a time is inferred as the cause of
the input stream. The other image is not, and therefore it is not
perceived (unconscious alternative). The unfolding argument
does not apply, because predictive processing can be unfolded
(Doerig, Schurger, et al. (2019); but see Kleiner (2019) and
Kleiner and Hoel (2020)).
The main question is what defines predictive processing? If it
is restricted to the human brain, there is no computational
understanding of the crucial characteristics and the other sys-
tems problem arises. If instead it is defined by simple mechan-
isms (such as classic predictive coding networks proposed by
Rao & Ballard, 1999), the small network argument kicks in.
In summary, PPT needs to show that it can cope simulta-
neously with the small network and other systems arguments.
Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART). Grossberg (2017) pro-
posed that consciousness occurs when neurons are in an
Adaptive Resonant (AR) state. AR states occur when top-
down expectations are combined with bottom-up sensory
information. Top-down expectations take the form of
a memory template that is compared with the actual features
of an object as detected by the senses in a recurrent loop. All
conscious states are proposed to be AR states, but the con-
verse is not true. In this framework, consciousness is one of
several emergent properties of self-organizing neural sys-
tems, which work together to enable brains to autonomously
learn to attend, recognize, and predict objects and events in
an ever-changing world. AR states provide a mechanism to
combine sensory input, expectations, attention, memory, etc.
into a coherent subjective percept. It is proposed that hier-
archical AR computations are needed to deal with uncer-
tainty. In computational models, AR states match subjective
effects such as illusory contours, which are only in the eye of
the beholder (see IV.1 and the Hermann-Hering grid). These
effects are not ‘in’ the stimulus, but they are present in con-
scious experience.
ART offers both conscious and unconscious alternatives
(there may or may not arise an AR state after stimulus presen-
tation for example), and addresses paradigm cases of con-
sciousness such as masking. There is no other systems
problem: systems that implement AR states are conscious
(although the fact that not all AR states are conscious states
may pose a problem in this respect). However, AR states can be
implemented with very few neurons (even a hierarchy of AR
computations can be implemented with <100 neurons), so the
small (and the large) network argument applies (III.3).
Moreover, depending on the interpretation of ART, the unfold-
ing argument may apply (III.2).
In summary, ART needs to specify how it copes with the
small network argument and how exactly conscious resonant
states differ from unconscious resonant ones.
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Cognitive theories
Sensorimotor Theory (SMT). The sensorimotor theory of phe-
nomenal consciousness (as proposed initially in O’Regan and
Noë (2001) and developed more extensively in Noë (2004) and
O’Regan (2011)) proposes a view about what sensory experi-
ences or ‘feels’ really consist of. Instead of assuming that feels
are things that are generated by the brain and happen to you,
the theory suggests that feels should be understood as ‘things
that you do’. Understood this way, the quality of a feel lies in the
law that describes the sensorimotor interaction involved when
you experience the feel. For example, the softness of a sponge is
an abstract law that describes the fact that when you press the
sponge it squishes under the pressure of your fingers. Feeling
the softness of the sponge involvesmentally probingwhether at
this moment your interaction with the world obeys the sensor-
imotor laws of softness. More generally, having a feel with
a particular quality means being currently mentally poised to
confirm that the sensorimotor laws corresponding to that qual-
ity are valid. For example, vision feels different from audition
because sensorimotor input from seeing depends differently on
your movements than from hearing.
SMT can address paradigm cases of consciousness by pro-
posing different sensorimotor interactions in conscious vs.
unconscious cases. The unfolding argument does not apply,
since sensorimotor loops could be unfolded. The sensorimotor
loops proposed by SMT seem very complex so that the SNA
does not apply. The main challenges for SMT stem from its
vague mechanism. The question is what defines sensorimotor
interactions? If sensorimotor interactions are restricted to
humans, there is no generalizable understanding of the crucial
characteristics and the other systems problem arises: what
makes human brains special? Which other systems have this
special kind of sensorimotor interactions and are conscious?
One issue for SMT in trying to propose a precise mechanism to
cope with the other systems argument is that the small net-
work argument may kick in. If, for example, sensorimotor inter-
actions are defined as information processing loops or other
simple computational features, a thermostat would be
conscious.
Self Comes To Mind (SCM). For Damasio (2010), the self is the
key to consciousness. The self is a collection of neural pro-
cesses centred on representing and monitoring the state of
the body in order to maintain homeostasis. The crucial step in
the emergence of consciousness is not about perception, i.e.,
the creation of the content of consciousness, but making the
percepts our percepts. The self is vital because it acts as
a witness to the mind, and this is the only way we can know
about mental events. Thus, we become conscious of events
when the corresponding representations interact with the
self.
The brain maps the world around it and it maps its own
properties. Those maps are experienced as images in our
minds. The special kind of mental images of the body pro-
duced in body-mapping structures, constitutes the protoself.
Interacting with an object leads to that object’s representation
in maps, and changes the state of the body, thus altering to
protoself. This brings the object into consciousness. It becomes
salient. This intrinsically present-moment form is termed core
consciousness. In brains endowed with abundant memory, lan-
guage, and reasoning, narratives with this same simple origin
and contour are enriched, thus producing a well-defined pro-
tagonist, an autobiographical self. Thus, the entire fabric of
a conscious mind is created from the same cloth – images
generated by the brain’s map-making abilities. Critchley et al.
(2004), Park and Tallon-Baudry (2014) and Faivre et al. (2015)
have also argued that self representations in the brain are
crucial for consciousness.
The proposed mechanism is the interaction of the self and
other representations. SCMT is not geared towards paradigm
consciousness but is rather about subjectivity and cognition
in general, such as how the inner and outer world are mapped
and how these maps may interact. Nevertheless, state para-
digm cases such as coma vs. wakefulness are addressed (they
correspond to different states of the self representations) as
well as content paradigm cases such as masking (because the
mask precludes the target from interacting with the self
representations). There is an unconscious alternative when
the object representation and the self do not interact. The
other systems argument is a challenge, asking what is special
about the human implementation of the self. The mechanism
seems to vaguely defined to tell which other systems are
conscious.
In summary, SCM needs to explain what is special about the
human self, to cope with the other systems argument.
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